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Abstract Luck (2009) argues that gamers face a dilemma
when it comes to performing certain virtual acts. Most
gamers regularly commit acts of virtual murder, and take
these acts to be morally permissible. They are permissible
because unlike real murder, no one is harmed in perform-
ing them; their only victims are computer-controlled
characters, and such characters are not moral patients.
What Luck points out is that this justification equally
applies to virtual pedophelia, but gamers intuitively think
that such acts are not morally permissible. The result is a
dilemma: either gamers must reject the intuition that virtual
pedophelic acts are impermissible and so accept partaking
in such acts, or they must reject the intuition that virtual
murder acts are permissible, and so abstain from many (if
not most) extant games. While the prevailing solution to
this dilemma has been to try and find a morally relevant
feature to distinguish the two cases, I argue that a different
route should be pursued. It is neither the case that all acts of
virtual murder are morally permissible, nor are all acts of
virtual pedophelia impermissible. Our intuitions falter and
produce this dilemma because they are not sensitive to the
different contexts in which games present virtual acts.
Keywords Gamer’s dilemma  Videogames  Virtual
acts  Computer games  Virtual murder  Virtual
pedophilia  Applied ethics
A gamer (or player) is a moral agent who plays video-
games, and a virtual act is an act which a gamer performs,
using her in-game character, on a computer-controlled (but
not human-controlled) character in the game’s virtual
world.1 According to Luck (2009), gamers face a dilemma
when it comes to performing certain virtual acts. This is
because most gamers regularly commit acts of virtual
murder (which are virtual acts that would have counted as
murder had the virtual environment in which they were
performed been real), and take these acts to be morally
permissible. They are permissible because unlike real
murder, no one is harmed in performing them; their only
victims are computer-controlled characters, and such
characters are neither moral agents nor moral patients.2
What Luck points out is that this justification equally
applies to virtual pedophilia (which are virtual acts that
would have counted as pedophelic had the virtual envi-
ronment in which they were performed been real), but
gamers intuitively think that such acts are not morally
permissible. The result is a dilemma: either gamers must
reject the intuition that virtual pedophelic acts are imper-
missible and so accept partaking in such acts, or they must
reject the intuition that acts of virtual murder are permis-
sible, and so abstain from many (if not most) extant games.
This paper emerged out of the University of Miami’s 2014 summer
ethics grant, and benefitted from two presentations I gave after joining
the Lebanese American University, one in the Philosophy and
Computer Gamers 2014 conference in Istanbul, Turkey, and the other
in the American University of Beirut in Lebanon. The paper also
benefitted from the feedback I received on the paper from three
gamers (Majd Akar, Hosni Auji, and Nael Taher), and four
philosophers (Bradford Cokelet, Bashshar Haidar, and two
anonymous reviewers).
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1 Department of Humanities, Lebanese American University,
P.O. Box 13-5053, Chouran Beirut 1102 2801, Lebanon
1 Sometimes videogames are referred to as computer games, but
throughout I will use the term videogames which is the term
commonly used by gamers. In some cases, I will omit the word
‘video’ and use ‘game’.
2 Where moral patients are objects of moral consideration, though not
morally responsible themselves e.g. babies and in some cases,
animals.
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There are multiple ways one might react to this
dilemma. Luck (2009), and the subsequent literature that
has arisen around the dilemma (specifically, Bartel 2012;
Patridge 2013; Luck and Ellerby 2013), have pursued a
solution which rests on finding some morally relevant
distinction between the two acts, such that acts of virtual
murder, but not virtual pedophilia, can be performed
without moral qualms. This, however, is only one way of
solving the dilemma. We can clearly see this by consid-
ering the premises leading up to the dilemma:
P1—Intuitively, gamers believe that virtual murder is
morally permissible, and that virtual pedophilia is morally
impermissible.
P2—Virtual murder is morally permissible because no
one is (directly) harmed in the performance.3
P3—However, it is also true that no one is (directly)
harmed by virtual pedophilia.
P4—In addition, there is no other morally relevant dis-
tinctions to justify a differential attitude towards these acts.
C—Therefore, gamers must (on pain of inconsistency)
reject their intuitions, either they must believe that acts of
virtual pedophilia are permissible, or reject that acts of
virtual murder are.
Aside from embracing the conclusion and thus adopting
one of two revisionary attitudes (either partaking in virtual
pedophelic acts, or abstaining from virtual murders), one
may reject any of the argument’s premises, and not just the
fourth premise.
Of course not every premise is equally susceptible to
criticism. P2 and P3 both seem unobjectionable.With P2 it is
hard to see how the harmlessness of virtual murder is not the
reason for its moral permissibility. Likewise, P3 seems true,
since neither act has a victim. Even if one maintains that the
gamer who performs the act of virtual pedophilia is herself
harmed (for instance, on virtue ethical grounds, or on the
grounds that engaging in such acts increases the likelihood of
performing and/or desiring the real life counterpart), it seems
that the same sort of (indirect) harm will be present in cases
of virtual murder.4 This leaves P1 and P4. P4 is a promising
target, and this is why the literature focuses on undermining
it. But I do not think it an easy target. While there are moral
differences that allow us to distinguish some instances of
virtual murder from some instances of virtual pedophilia,5 to
reject P4 we need a moral difference distinguishing every
instance of virtual pedophilia from every instance of virtual
murder. Such a difference has not been forthcoming,6 and
indeed if my argument here is right, there is no such perva-
sive difference.7 Consequently, my aim is to pursue the
hitherto unexplored strategy of rejecting P1. P1 seems to me
implausible because virtual acts in games serve different
contexts, and these contexts matter to the moral status of a
given act. The result is that it is neither the case that all acts of
virtual murder are acceptable, nor that all acts of virtual
pedophilia are unacceptable (in this sense, the view is both
conservative and radical). This skepticism about P1 is not
entirely idiosyncratic. Other gamers I have spoken to have
shared my skepticism, and in addition, in the extant litera-
ture, Patridge (2013) rejects part of P1, denying that all vir-
tual murder is acceptable. She writes ‘‘on this view not all
acts of virtual murder get a moral pass….virtual murder too
can be represented in such a way that reasonably connects it
to our moral reality, it might also be subject to moral
criticism.’’8
The constitution and moral significance of virtual
acts
To see why P1 should be rejected, we first need to
understand how virtual acts are constituted, and how they
acquire their moral significance. This will tell us how we
should individuate virtual acts, and evaluate them. We can
begin by noting that the gamer’s dilemma takes for granted
that virtual acts have moral significance despite their lack
of victims. Plausibly, this moral significance derives from
the effect on the only moral agents involved in the act, the
gamers and those observing their virtual acts.9 There are
many ways in which this moral effect might arise. For
instance, through increasing or decreasing the likelihood of
committing real life counterparts, or through the systematic
effect on one’s moral viewpoint of equivalent real-life acts.
For our purposes, however, we need not commit to a
3 I add the term ‘direct’ to exclude the possibility of indirect harm.
One might think that either act produces indirect harms, for instance,
to society as a whole, or the player. For instance McCormick (2001)
argues that Aristotelians can plausibly argue against playing certain
types of games. This seems to be the idea that some critics of
videogames have, that e.g. playing games normalizes violence, or is a
form of idleness, or anti-social behavior.
4 Perhaps empirical evidence can show otherwise, but in the absence
of such evidence it is hard to see why one should default on accepting
this asymmetry.
5 For instance, see Bartel (2012).
6 For instance see Patridge (2013) and Luck and Ellerby (2013).
7 However I am sympathetic to the idea that some instances of virtual
pedophilia can be differentiated from virtual murder. Specifically, I
think that Bartel’s argument does show that some instances of virtual
pedophilia (those that depict the act in a certain way) are instances of
child pornography, and thus can be distinguished from virtual murder
on those grounds.
8 Patridge (2013, p. 33).
9 Game observers have always been existed; in many cases one or
two people will play a game while their friend or friends watch them
play. But more recently, with the advances in the cinematic quality of
games, and the rise and integration of services like Twitch, game
observers are an increasingly large part of videogaming.
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specific mechanism. All we need to keep in mind is that
virtual acts have a moral significance, and this significance
derives from those directly engaging with (but not neces-
sarily playing) the game.
Turning to the constitution of virtual acts, we can start
by noting that like real life acts, the identity of virtual acts
partly depends on the context of the performance. Whether
a real life act is one of murder or self-defense depends on
the situation the agent is in e.g. whether the agent is being
attacked or not. With virtual acts, however, a further
complication arises. This is because virtual acts have two
different contexts. Their is the in-game context of the act,
which is the context of the game character in its virtual
world, and there is the gamer’s context, which is the con-
text of the gamer performing the in-game acts. Clarifying
the relationship between these two contexts is thus the first
step in understanding how virtual acts are constituted.
A plausible first hypothesis is that virtual acts are indi-
viduated by their in-game context. For instance, consider an
act of virtual killing. Whether this act counts as virtual
murder or virtual self-defense depends on the situation of the
character in its virtualworld. This situation is provided by the
game designers who build the world, populate it, and allow
the gamer to interactwith it through themediation of a digital
display (e.g. a tv) and somemeans of controlling events (e.g.
through a controller) in the game world.10 As an example, in
the Uncharted (2007-present) series gamers control a (vir-
tual) human character, Nathan Drake, who is a modern day
treasure hunter placed in dangerous situations, with (virtual)
human characters out to kill him. Because of this, when
gamers direct Drake to kill in his world, the killings done by
Drake are (usually) instances of self-defense. This in turn
means that the gamer’s virtual killings are instances of vir-
tual self-defense. By contrast, in the game Dishonored
(2012), the gamer controls an assassin who is free to nego-
tiate his surroundings with stealth instead of killing. When
the protagonist in this game kills, he therefore commits
murder. Similarly, when the gamer commands him to do so,
he commits an act of virtual murder.11
This first hypothesis is plausible, but incomplete. While
it is true that the gamer’s contribution to the virtual world
depends on what the contribution amounts to in that world,
it is also true that the what the act amounts to in that world
may be entirely irrelevant to the gamer’s virtual perfor-
mance. A fuller picture requires that we also attend to the
context of the gamer performing the virtual acts. We can
see this missing part by noting that a gamer can engage
with a game world in various ways. She can perform acts
with or without knowing their in-game significance, and
with or without regard for that significance. A gamer will
know the significance of the acts if she is following the in-
game narrative, and will (usually) not if she simply jumps
into the game e.g. by trying it at a friend’s house. She will
give regard to the significance of acts if they seek to
appropriately engage with that world, performing acts that
are basically in-line with the game’s narrative. She will
ignore that significance if she either willfully acts in a way
that gives no regard to the context, or inadvertently because
she is unaware of the context.
The way gamers engage with the game affects our
individuation of virtual acts. To see this consider a case in
which the gamer disregards the act’s in-game significance.
Imagine a morally degenerate gamer who fantasizes about
murdering others, notices that he resembles Nathan Drake,
and so plays the game with the sole purpose of enacting his
fantasies. We can imagine that the gamer entirely disre-
gards the narrative, perhaps muting the game and skipping
any story sequences. We can now ask concerning this
player, what act does he perform? On the one hand it is
clear that Drake continues to perform the very same act in
the game’s fiction. If the act was one of self-defense, it
continues to be so. However, since the gamer is not aware
of the in-game context, and anyway would choose to dis-
regard it if he was aware of it, it seems implausible to
attribute virtual self-defense to him. Instead his act is
plausibly one of virtual murder. What he is doing is vir-
tually murdering, but the way he commits this act is
through Drake’s act of self-defense.
Where does this leave us with respect to the constitution
of virtual acts? On the one hand, individuating virtual acts
wholly by the in-game context seems to misdirect the
dilemma. The dilemma is aimed at gamers and their acts,
but focusing solely on the in-game context turns the
dilemma into a problem for designers and the sorts of acts
they depict in games.12 Indeed the dilemma would have
nothing to do with gamers engaging in those acts. On the
other hand, if virtual acts depend wholly on the gamer’s
context, then any in-game act will turn out impermissible
or permissible depending on the gamer’s intention in the
performance. The morality of virtual acts will turn on
whether the gamer engages with these acts in a morally
perverse manner or not, and not on the type of act per-
formed (whether virtual murder or virtual pedophilia). In
10 While it is hard and maybe impossible to given necessary and
sufficient conditions for when something counts as a videogame, it is
plausible to think that games must minimally allow the gamer the
capacity to interact with the virtual world through virtual acts.
11 In addition, it is plausibly the case that the gamer’s acts are
justified differently depending on the in-game context. When Drake
attacks an enemy, he is justified because he is acting in self-defense.
But similarly, the gamer too is justified in performing the virtual
killing, since her act counts as an act of virtual self-defense.
12 For two informative discussions of issues arising from what
designers choose to depict, see Brey (1999), and Patridge (2011).
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this sense, depending wholly on the gamer’s context triv-
ializes the dilemma.13
This reveals an ambiguity in the argument leading up to
the gamer’s dilemma. Specifically, P1 is not clear about
which sorts of acts it is discussing: are these virtual acts that
are due to the in-game context, or virtual acts due to the
gamer’s context? I think the answer is neither.We should not
individuate virtual acts either by the in-game context alone
nor the gamer’s context alone. The first leaves the gamer
irrelevant to the dilemma, the second leaves the contents of
the game irrelevant to the dilemma. By contrast, I think we
should adopt an appropriate engagement view of virtual
acts. On this view both contexts have significance. Acts are
individuated by the gamer’s appropriate engagement with
the in-game context. So, when appropriately engaging a
game, the gamer lets her context be dictated by the in-game
context, and in so doing performs a particular virtual act.
Sport, storytelling, and simulation
I argued that the gamer’s dilemma concerns itself with
those acts that a gamer performs when appropriately
engaging with the videogame world. But what counts as
appropriately engaging with a given world? The answer to
this question depends on the ends of the game designers in
presenting a given world. Game designers have reasons
that are extrinsic to the game itself, such as wishing to
profit from the game, or doing what the company asks. But
they also have reasons intrinsic to the game world itself. In
producing a game, game designers construct a virtual world
and a means of interacting with it with the intention of
engaging the gamer in a particular way. It is in these ways
of engaging gamers that we see what constitutes appro-
priate engagement with a given game.
A survey of current and past videogames reveals at least
three different ways in which games seek to engage their
audience. A first means of engaging the gamer is providing
her with a virtual space in which a sporting or competitive
event is held. Some of the earliest videogames, like Pong
(1972), were designed solely with the intent of allowing
gamers to virtually compete. This trend continued with
arcade games focused on high scores and leaderboards, and
continues today with popular multiplayer shooters like Call
of Duty (2003-present). Indeed it is plausible to think that
games in general have had competition as one of their
central constituents (consider chess).
A second mode of engagement involves providing the
gamer with a virtual space in which a story is told. Sto-
rytelling games also emerged early on in the history of
gaming. For example, the early Legend of Zelda (1986)
tells a simple story in which the protagonist, Link, seeks to
rescue a princess, Zelda. Similarly, the Sonic the Hedgehog
(1991-present) games focus on the story of Sonic who
seeks to free his animal friends from the machine obsessed
scientist Dr. Eggman/Robotnik. This form of game is also
increasingly more popular with advances in technology
that allow for more complex and cinematic stories, for
instance those seen in games like Uncharted or The Last of
Us (2013).
Finally, a third way of engaging gamers involves pro-
viding them with a virtual space in which various acts and
events can be simulated.We can call these simulation games.
Such games are harder to characterize because unlike
sporting and storytelling games, they do not make explicit
demands from the player. Unlike sporting games, they do not
challenge the player to meet some criteria that constitutes
winning e.g. a high score, or points against the other team.
Though one may acquire proficiency at these games,
attaining mastery over one’s virtual freedom in the game (in
the sense of being better able to control the game, and thus do
what one wants), such mastery is entirely optional. They are
also unlike storytelling games. They do not tell a story,
though they might provide a context which allows for sto-
rytelling (e.g. a virtual world, a protagonist, certain per-
formable actions). Instead, what characterizes these games is
their focus on enjoying or exercising a virtual freedom in a
given domain. In providing the playerwith a virtual freedom,
the freedom to perform certain acts, or partake in specific
events in a virtual world, such games simulate our natural
freedom, and in this sense are simulations.14
Like sport and storytelling games, simulation games
emerged early on in videogame history. Microsoft Flight
Simulator (1982) and SimCity (1989) are two old examples.
InMicrosoft Flight Simulator, the game provides a realistic
plane flying simulation. This sets up a minimal context for
the game, but little else is demanded from the player. One
cannot win, since the game does not demand that you learn
how to fly the plane. Crashing stylishly, or not, is equally
permitted. Similarly the simulator provides no story. The
game provides the context of flying a plane, but this alone is
13 Young’s (2013) paper explores this strategy of individuating acts
exclusively by the gamer’s context (in Young’s paper, the ‘gamer’s
motivations’). Unsurprisingly, the conclusion is that we cannot justify
the differential treatment of virtual murder and virtual pedophilia by
focusing solely on such motivations.
14 This way of understanding simulation games should be distin-
guished from a narrower use of ‘simulation’, in which a simulation is
in some sense realistic, presenting the player with real or realistic
events or actions. As I use the term, simulations can be realistic, but
they can also be entirely fantastical in the events and actions they
provide. This is because I define these games as (focusing on)
providing a simulation of our lived freedom, not a simulation of some
particular content. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for helping me
clarify this point.
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not a story. It ismore the case that one tells one’s own story in
this context, e.g. how one is learning to be a pilot, how one
will perform a suicidal stunt. Stories of that sort are the
gamer’s own construction, even if the construct is con-
strained by the virtual context. This lack of demands suggests
that the in-game context of simulation games is simply to
allow the gamer to enjoy the lack of demands. One way to
think of this is that such games provide an in-game context
designed to let the gamer’s own context define the experi-
ence. Like sport and storytelling games, simulation games
have become more advanced over the years. Some recent
examples are The Sims (2000-present), Noby Noby Boy
(2009), and Minecraft (2011).
Before proceeding, it is worth making two clarificatory
points. First, the tripartite distinction above is not meant to
indicate that games for the most part, or necessarily, engage
games in only one of these ways. In practice, most games
involve some combination of sporting, storytelling, and
simulation. A series that particularly succeeds at all three of
these is Grand Theft Auto (1997-present), where the games
tell the story of a corrupt protagonist in a big city, but also
give the player the freedom to roam the large city aimlessly
as a simulation would, and provide various sporting events
within that city (e.g. racing, attempting stunts). The dis-
tinction, however, is supposed to capture the idea that there
are different modes of engagement that might be central to a
game. Second, the fact that there is some standard of
appropriately engaging a game should not be taken to indi-
cate that gamers must, or largely do engage with their games
appropriately. When a gamer plays a sporting game, to
appropriately engage, she must compete, or at least try to.
But equally, the player might simply join the game with the
sole purpose of appreciating the scenery, or with the intent of
observing one particular player. Similarly a story game
might be played with the intent of beating it as quickly as
possible (a ‘speed run’), thus turning it into a sporting game.
The point, however, is that in doing so gamers use the game
and the available actions for their own ends, not for the ends
that are specified by the game.
Virtual murder and virtual pedophilia
The gamer’s dilemma focuses on virtual acts, and such acts
are individuated by the gamer’s appropriate engagement
with the in-game context. Since there are at least three
different ways in which the gamer might appropriately
engage with any given game, it is reasonable to wonder
whether our P1 intuitions hold across storytelling, sport,
and simulation games. In this section, I focus on story-
telling and simulation games only, arguing that our intu-
itions about these types of games differ, and thus
sufficiently establish a case against P1.
Before turning to storytelling and simulation games,
however, it is worth dwelling momentarily on the in-game
representations of murder and pedophilia. Discussing the
moral status of videogames, Tavinor (2009)writes ‘‘There is,
then, a genuine reason for the events and actions depicted in
games to be morally criticized, even if fictional: represen-
tations in themselves are amenable to moral criticism,
especially when they express an objectionable viewpoint.’’15
Tavinor cites two ways in which representations in games
can be objectionable, the representation itself may be
objectionable, and the viewpoint these representations serve
might be so too. The first of these points helps solve a limited
version of the problem,16 which Bartel (2012) endorses. On
Bartel’s view, we can reject P4 of the dilemma because the
relevant difference between virtual murder and virtual ped-
ophilia is that the latter but not the former counts as child
pornography, which is objectionable. While this reason
explains some cases, it plausibly does not explain all, since
visual representations of virtual pedophilia might be highly
abstracted (e.g. presented in Hotline Miami’s (2012) visual
style), or nonexistent (e.g. the act is presented off screen).17
In addition, it is unclear that all murder imagery will be
acceptable, since some imagery might involve gratuitous
detail. Despite these shortcomings, I think Bartel is right to
point out that we can understand why some acts of virtual
pedophilia are so unacceptable: they simply represent the act
unacceptably (e.g. by fetishizing the act, depicting it
pornographically, or with the intent to evoke curiosity or
desire). So in what follows, my argument focuses on depic-
tions or representations that are not problematic in this way.
My aim is to show that provided the representation itself is
not unacceptable, acts of virtual murder and virtual pedo-
philia are not different in any clear-cut way.
To see this, it will be sufficient to contrast virtual murder
and virtual pedophilia as they occur in storytelling and
simulation contexts. First, consider storytelling games.
Since such games provide a narrative, it is reasonable to
think that their narrative provides a moral viewpoint of the
sort Tavinor discusses. Provided that neither the represen-
tations nor the viewpoint of the game are objectionable, it
seems we should accept instances of both virtual pedo-
philia and virtual murder. To see this, consider an example
using the God of War (2005-present) games. These games
are undoubtedly violent, portraying a vengeful and morally
questionable protagonist, Kratos. But the viewpoint of the
game is not itself objectionable. The games seeks to
15 Tavinor (2009, p. 164).
16 See Luck and Ellerby (2013).
17 Of course one might think that no representation of pedophilia, not
even textual representation is acceptable. This however would be a
radical position, requiring much more than the banning of certain
virtual acts.
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contribute to a mythical history of ancient Greece. Just as
we hear stories of betrayal, war, and other morally ques-
tionable acts taking place amongst Greek heroes and
Olympian gods in Homer’s Odyssey, so we see in the God
of War games. The game asks us to be moved by Kratos’
plight, and we experience, indeed enact, his heroism,
resolve, and anger. At least intuitively, our acts of virtual
killing in such a game are acceptable, much as the killings
in The Odyssey are.18 But now consider the possibility of a
future iteration depicting Kratos committing pedophilia.
The God of War games already contain scenes in which the
gamer controls Kratos as he has sex off-screen, and we can
imagine that in this instance Kratos, by way of cruelly
punishing (as is typical of Kratos) a human colluding with
the Olympians, takes his young son or daughter and
molests the child. There is no question that what Kratos
does is wrong. Yet is it equally clear that what the gamer
does is wrong? If the gamer performs the act by way of
appropriately engaging the narrative, it is unclear why that
act should be singled out as questionable. By stipulation
the image itself is not pornographic, and all of Kratos’
actions are at least equally questionable. Indeed, the case
seems to be comparable to reading a fictional book about
an immoral protagonist who, amongst others things, is a
pedophile.
One may remain unconvinced on two counts. First, one
may think that there is a relevant difference here, and it is
that the gamer controls Kratos. This is unlike a fictional
book, where the reader only observes the story. This
objection is not convincing. The act of using the game
controller is obviously not what is at stake, it is rather that
the inputs we give allow the representation of pedophilia to
unfold. But it is hard to see why this is significantly dif-
ferent from a book. After all, the act of reading allows the
representation of pedophilia to unfold, and the reader can,
just as much as the gamer, put the book/controller down.
Perhaps the thought is that the difference arises only in
specific conditions, namely, those in which the gamer
controls Kratos, and chooses the act freely. For any token
act in a videogame, the game gives the gamer some level of
freedom in performing the act. Some acts are entirely not
up to the gamer, as when the game enters into a cutscene
where the player watches the character do something
without being given control. Such cases are more like
watching a movie than playing a game. Other acts give the
gamer control over the act, but do not give her a choice in
whether to perform it or not. The act is simply required if
the story is to make progress. Finally, the gamer may be
given control over the act, and also given a choice in
whether or not to perform it, since there are multiple paths
of progress. Perhaps the claim is that it is only virtual acts
of the last sort that cannot involve virtual pedophilia.
But even this is implausible. If as the gamer you are given
the option of either having Kratos violently and graphically
murder the entire family (which, in the game’s typical style,
will be on-screen), or given the option of having Kratos
molest the child off-screen, it is not clear that you as a gamer
have chosen a virtually permissible act in one case but not the
other. Moreover we can once again compare the situation to
that of reading a book. A few books allow the reader to pick
one or more path in progressing a story, or have more than
one ending.Now imagine a case that parallels theGod ofWar
case. Is it clear that one must avoid the ending that contains
pedophilia but not the one that contains murder? My intu-
ition, at the very least, is that the answer is no. It is not that the
acts do not differ, it is that both are consistent with the story
being told in the game’s fiction. So it seems to me that the
extent of our freedom in a storytelling game is not relevant to
the permissibility of virtual murder or impermissibility of
virtual pedophilia.
One might remain unconvinced for a different reason.
When Luck defines virtual pedophilia, he says that such
acts are ones that would have counted as pedophilia had
they been real. Perhaps one could think that in the context
provided in the God of War games, the act of molesting a
child is not pedophilia. One might appeal to the fact that
the games occur in a mythical age, or in the distant past
when sexual interactions with children were acceptable.
This strikes me as implausible. But even if we assume its
truth, it is just as easy to come up with an example that is
clearly a case of in-game pedophilia. A good example may
be derived from the survival horror series, Silent Hill
(1999-present). In these games, the gamer takes on the role
of a protagonist who is, for one reason or another, psy-
chologically disturbed. Silent Hill 2 (2001) is a particularly
good example. In it, the gamer controls a character who has
murdered his own wife. The gamer controls this character
as he uncovers the repressed truth about what he has done.
Consider now the possibility of a Silent Hill game that
takes on an equivalent scenario involving pedophilia. This
would be clearly a case of pedophilia since the game is set
in modern times and in a realistic setting, yet it is not clear
that a virtual pedophelic act in that game would be
impermissible. Part of the point of depicting and allowing
the player to perform that act is to evoke a sense of psy-
chological disturbance in the player, and this is what Silent
Hill games aim to do. Moreover Silent Hill is not an
exception in the videogame world. Other games have also
focused on morally disturbing scenarios. For instance,
Heavy Rain’s (2010) focus is on a father forced to perform
18 Of course one important difference is that in the one case but not
the other, this violence is visually depicted. However it seems to me
that one might envision a movie that portrays as much violence as
God of War whilst still being morally acceptable. Alternatively, one
can imagine a visually toned down version of the game and compare
that to The Odyssey.
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dangerous, self-harming, and immoral acts in order to
retrieve his kidnapped child.
Given the above examples, I think we should conclude
that when it comes to storytelling games, acts of virtual
murder and virtual pedophilia can be equally acceptable/
unacceptableI. This is because their unacceptability hinges
on the very same features of the game, namely, the moral
viewpoint of the story, and the use of objectionable or non-
objectionable representations. This alone refutes P1 of the
dilemma, it explains how some virtual murders are unac-
ceptable (they occur in a story with an objectionable moral
viewpoint), and how some virtual pedophilia are accept-
able (they occur in a unobjectionable story). But alone, this
explanation does not explain away our original intuitions.
To supplement the response, we must turn to our intuitions
about simulation games. Is it the case that acts of virtual
murder and virtual pedophilia are acceptable in such
games?
I think our intuitions shift in simulation games. We do
not think that either act is morally acceptable. This is
because simulation games do not provide their own nar-
rative, they simply allow the gamer’s context to define the
in-game context. So, when a gamer enacts murder or
pedophilia in these games, the act is one of virtual murder
or virtual pedophilia because the gamer defines it in this
way. As such, the act here reflects the sorts of act the gamer
finds desirable. Perhaps it is easier to see how a virtual
pedophelic act in a simulation context may be impermis-
sible, but harder to see why virtual murder is. An example,
however, can shed light on this issue. Consider the popular
Grand Theft Auto series, which, recall, is a particularly
good case of a game with storytelling, simulation, and
sporting aspects. This series of games has caused much
controversy outside the videogame world, and this seems
largely because the game gives gamers free reign to com-
mit a fairly large variety of (mainly) murderous actions.
But for gamers, Grand Theft Auto is not a violence simu-
lation, it is rather a story with a particular mood. The game
provides a beautifully designed, expansive, and detailed
virtual worlds, where the gameplay serves as a means of
unfolding a darkly humorous story that sets the stage for
the immoral protagonist. Every Grand Theft Auto game
provides an elaborate storytelling context, with which it
critiques and lampoons society’s violence and injustice.
But to those outside videogame culture, the only salient
aspect is the freeroaming violence that can be enacted.
Grand Theft Auto looks like a simulation game, although it
is a story game with simulation elements.
Now imagine that society is right. Imagine a Grand Theft
Auto stripped of its storytelling components. The game, in
such a case, would actually be a violence simulator. Is it so
clear that the resultant game,whose sole purpose is to put you
in a city where you can virtually choose to abuse, murder,
rob, and otherwise harass others, is morally permissible? Or
more to the point, is it clear that the acts you engage in, when
you appropriately engage with this game, are acts that we
would think morally permissible? It seems to me that the
answer is no. One’s virtual acts in this game are not morally
permissible, not if their only pretext is enjoying the freedom
and performance of these acts.
With this last piece in place, we can now provide a
diagnosis of the initial plausibility of P1. P1 seems intuitive
initially because when we originally consider acts of virtual
murder and virtual pedophilia, we default on acts of virtual
murder presented in current games, where these games are
either storytelling or sporting games, but then proceed to
compare those to acts of virtual pedophilia in hypothetical
simulation games. The reason for this is simple: there are
plenty of games that present virtual murder in storytelling
and sporting contexts, and few if any games portray virtual
murder in a simulation context.19 By contrast there are no
(at least well-known) games depicting pedophilia of any
sort.20 So when we are asked to think about such cases, we
default on thinking of a simulation of virtual pedophilia.
One might wonder why simulations are what we should
imagine by default. There may be several reasons for this.
But I think one primary reason is that when we think of a
game containing pedophilia, our first instinct is to think
that the reason for portraying the act cannot be anything but
enjoying the act, and wanting to perform it. Unlike killing,
which is often a means of acquiring something more than
the death of the murdered (for instance, winning the war,
defending oneself, getting one’s own way, or revenge),
pedophilia seems to function as an (unjustifiable) end, and
not as a means to some further outcome. ‘Why would
anyone commit such an act but for the enjoyment of that
act?’, the thought goes. From this, I contend, we move to
the idea of a game depicting the act so that it may enjoyed
for its own sake, since otherwise there is little reason to
perform the act. Of course, a game that allows us to enjoy
the act for its own sake would be a simulation game.
19 A potential example of a murder simulator is the game Manhunt
(2003). While the game is not a pure murder simulator, it does get
close to being one. The game, in line with the intuitions I have,
elicited a negative response, being banned in New Zealand, Germany,
and Australia.
20 It should be said that few games depict any sex at all. Indeed
videogame have only recently come to depict sexual contents
comfortably, partly due to earlier societal perceptions that games
cannot deal with mature topics like sexuality. Killing, by contrast, has
always had a place in games since such acts are a convenient way of
challenging the gamer, and have the symbolic meaning in sporting
cases. For instance, a game like chess has pawns being eliminated
which is a highly symbolized killing, and many early games use
jumping on a computer-controlled character as a symbolic way of
killing it.
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This diagnosis of the dilemma may raise a final worry
about the proposed solution. If virtual murder can function
as a means to an end in a way virtual pedophilia is not, then
doesn’t this mean that virtual murder in simulation games
is both more comprehensible and acceptable than virtual
pedophilia? The first act, but not the second, suggests
motivations for the act aside from the sheer enjoyment of
it. This may suggest a narrower version of the gamer’s
dilemma. On this variant, the dilemma focuses on simu-
lation games, and maintains that our intuitions diverge with
respect to these two acts. In this case, P1 might be recon-
strued as follows: Intuitively, gamers believe that acts of
virtual murder are morally permissible, and similarly
positioned acts of virtual pedophilia are morally
impermissible.21
But it is not clear that this variant fares much better.
While killing may be a means to an (external) end in a way
pedophilia is not, if a gamer enacts virtual murder, rather
than, for instance, revenge, or self-defense, then it is an act
done with the intent of (virtually) harming someone who is
innocent. Moreover this is not a mere fantasy or imagining.
It is a way of materializing the fantasy, enacting it virtu-
ally, in a way that is perceptible to the gamer.22 It is in
having this desire, and seeking to actualize it, that the
virtual murder is unacceptable. The same applies to
pedophilia. It is possible that we think the gamer’s actions
more unacceptable in the pedophilia case than the murder
case, but this is not because we think the former is okay.
Conclusion
The standard solution to the gamer’s dilemma, which notes
that we differentially treat virtual murder and virtual ped-
ophilia despite the same justification being applicable to
both acts, has been to find a further, morally relevant dis-
tinction between these acts. I have argued that in place of
this standard solution, we should reject the intuitions that
found the dilemma. This is because once we clarify how
virtual acts are individuated, and how different games seek
to engage their gamers, we see that our intuitions in P1 are
not sensitive to differences between types of games. Once
we point out these differences, our intuitions change, and in
so doing reveal that P1 of the original dilemma is mistaken.
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